Complexity of control of Borda count elections by Russell, Nathan
Rochester Institute of Technology
RIT Scholar Works
Theses Thesis/Dissertation Collections
2007
Complexity of control of Borda count elections
Nathan Russell
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Thesis/Dissertation Collections at RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Theses by an authorized administrator of RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact ritscholarworks@rit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Russell, Nathan, "Complexity of control of Borda count elections" (2007). Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from
Rochester Institute of Technology
Department of Computer Science
Complexity of Control of Borda Count Elections
By
Nathan F. Russell
nfr1228@cs.rit.edu
July 9, 2007
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Computer Science
Edith Hemaspaandra, Chairperson
Christopher Homan, Reader
Piotr Faliszewski, Observer
1

Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction and history of the
Borda count 5
Chapter 2. Definitions 13
2.1. Elections in General 13
2.2. Means of control to be considered 17
Chapter 3. Prior work 23
3.1. Manipulation 23
3.2. Control 26
Chapter 4. Analysis of the Borda count 35
4.1. Addition and deletion of voters 35
4.2. Partition of voters 45
4.3. Addition and deletion of candidates 48
4.4. Summary of new results 50
Chapter 5. Conclusions 51
5.1. Further work 55
Bibliography 59
3

CHAPTER 1
Introduction and history of the Borda count
In this thesis, we discuss some existing and new results relating to
computational aspects of voting. In particular, we consider, apparently
for the first time, the computational complexity of the application of
certain types of control to the Borda count voting system. We use
control in the formal sense of attempts by an election’s administrator
to make a specific candidate win or lose by various means. We con-
sider control problems for weighted elections, as well as for unweighted
elections with voter preferences input both individually and in succinct
representation.
In many circumstances, groups of people need to decide between
several alternatives (“candidates”). The group may contain a large
number of stakeholders, who may disagree on which alternative(s) are
more desirable than others, and very often some or all pairs of alter-
natives are mutually incompatible. This requires the group to in some
manner combine (aggregate) the preferences of the individuals to reach
a decision which is (informally speaking) as acceptable as possible to
the members as a whole. Often, these preference aggregation systems
involve some form of voting. By formalizing the decision method into
a voting system, even those whose preferences are less influential in the
final result will ideally feel that they were dealt with fairly. While vot-
ing is most frequently considered in connection with political elections
and committees, preferences may be aggregated by voting in various
other contexts as well.
Originally, there was often a single individual (for example, a king
or queen) who made decisions for the entire group. This system made
complicated methods of social choice unnecessary but did not ensure
an ideal result from the perspective of other stakeholders. However, an
increasing number of modern societies follow the political philosophy
of democracy. This system has many variants, for example presidential
and parliamentary democracy, unicameral vs. bicameral legislatures, et
cetera. In every case, the governments of these societies utilize voting
in what we term “political elections”—to make decisions for the en-
tire group. Particularly, groups often use voting to elect legislators or
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other leaders, who may then vote among themselves about individual
decisions.
In fact, a very strong case can be made that voting is necessary to
popular rule. While small groups of a few people may be able to reach
an informal consensus on all issues, in larger groups someone (or some
small group) must be in charge, and voting may be the only fair way
to select that leader in the largest groups (in which everyone cannot
directly discuss potential leaders, and try to convince all others to form
a consensus). In the smallest democracies every citizen could weigh in
directly on every issue, as is done in a few private clubs. However,
in larger groups leadership is increasingly complicated and becomes a
full-time job.
Generally, it is a goal to have all voters be equal (or be unequal
in a precisely defined fashion). In order to do this, groups use voting
systems, in which the winner(s) are determined in what could be viewed
as an algorithmic manner. We briefly digress to discuss what an election
“is.” While this may seem trivial, in the course of discussing elections,
we can informally introduce some key concepts in the formalization we
will use. First, in some fashion (with which we are unconcerned) a
set of valid candidates (or, outside political elections, alternatives) is
generated. Each voter is given the list of candidates, and reports his or
her preferences over these candidates, formalized as an ordered list from
highest to lowest (we follow the literature and assume that preferences
are transitive, which may not always be the case, but simplifies our
arguments). Once the preferences are collected, some voting system
(alternatively, “social choice system”) is used to combine them into a
final result, a set of one or more winners. In the elections we consider,
there is assumed to be a single winner except in the special case in which
candidates are exactly tied, or in which for some reason no candidate
wins.
In political contexts, various voting systems may be used. Probably
the most common in leadership elections is plurality voting, in which
voters are asked only for their first preference, and the alternative which
receives the greatest number of votes wins. Other common systems in-
clude the single transferable vote (or instant runoff), which repeatedly
eliminates the candidate with the least number of first preferences, and
reassigns his or her votes to the voters’ next-highest preferences, un-
til only the desired number of winners are left (or, in the case of an
election with a single winner, until one alternative has a majority of
the votes). Another system is approval voting. In this system, rather
than ranking candidates, voters indicate whether or not they approve
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of each candidate. The winner(s) are the candidate(s) with the highest
number of voters approving of them.
This thesis considers a voting system known as the Borda count,
which will be described in greater detail later, but essentially involves
granting more points to candidates which a voter ranks higher. It also
considers all of a voter’s preferences, not merely the highest preference
as in the case of plurality voting, an artificial gap between approval
and non-approval as in approval voting, or some (often small) num-
ber of high preferences as in the case of the single transferable vote.
This aspect of the Borda count is an advantage in some ways from a
philosophical perspective, since all the information which a voter con-
tributes to the election is used. In systems such as plurality voting, the
vast majority of it (in a many-candidate election) is discarded, even
though it is quite plausible that there is more difference between a
voter’s opinion of his or her second and last choice of ten candidates
than there is between his or her opinion of the first and second. We
could imagine a voting system in which voters are allowed to report
how “far apart” they rank adjacent preferences, but such a system
would tempt voters to vote dishonestly (and might allow them to do
so without compromising the positive effects from their honest vote).
In political elections, it may often be the case that voters are not
informed about every candidate, or feel relatively neutral about their
“middle” preferences. In particular, they may strongly like or dislike
only one, or a few, candidates. In these cases, protocols such as plu-
rality or veto voting — in which a point is given to every preference
but the last — may be reasonable models. However, it is interesting
to note that the fact that the Borda count considers a voter’s entire
preference order is particularly important in those cases in which the
entirety of a voter’s preferences can reasonably can be seen as signifi-
cant. For example, the Borda count was used to combine the rankings
by judges in a wine tasting [Cop06]. In this setting, we might expect
that the judges saw (for example) their third-choice wine as distinct
from their fourth choice by just as much as they saw the first choice as
better than the second.
Since modern societies rely on voting in so many contexts, some of
which involve important matters such as who will be the next political
leader or how huge amounts of money will be spent, it is reasonable
to assume (and, indeed, indicated by history) that in some cases in-
dividuals will attempt to interfere with voting procedures, or to vote
dishonestly, in order to gain a personal advantage or to have more in-
fluence on the results than they should. If individual voters or some
subset of the voters cast votes which do not honestly represent their
8 1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY OF THE BORDA COUNT
preferences, we refer to this as manipulation (it is also termed strate-
gic voting in the special case when an individual voter, not colluding
with others in complicated fashions, is considered). Alternatively, those
responsible for the election (e.g., the chair) may alter the election pro-
cedures to change the results, without changing how voters choose to
vote, a situation termed control. Finally, it is possible that an alter-
ation of how voters vote is accomplished by bribing the voters. Bribery
is a method which we do not discuss at great length, though there is
an increasing amount of work on the topic. Particularly, Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra discuss bribery for many voting
systems, including Condorcet and Plurality voting; they also find some
general results for scoring protocols, such as the Borda count for fixed
numbers of candidates [FHH06].
Clearly, from the perspective of society’s integrity, preventing inter-
ference with elections is an important goal. This can be accomplished,
of course, by using election inspectors, security procedures, et cetera,
to make it more practically difficult for anyone to interfere (or, if they
do so, to escape detection). In practice, such methodologies are very
commonly used. However, at best, they enlarge the set of individuals
who must be corrupted by anyone who would exert control beyond a
certain point, or practice manipulation in a very large group. Alter-
natively, such strategies may limit the number of changes that can be
made (disqualifying ten voters may be easier for a chair to get away
with than removing a hundred). We can reasonably conclude, however,
that if it were possible a better alternative would be to choose a system
which, of and by itself, was difficult or impossible to interfere with.
It would be ideal if we could design election systems so that control
and manipulation are impossible to accomplish (what we will later term
immunity). However, it has long been known that is not possible for a
reasonable election (for relatively broad, common-sense definitions of
reasonable, for example one condition is that there be no voter with
exclusive influence over the result) to be immune to any type of con-
trol or manipulation that might be attempted. This was shown early
in the study of voting, with results such as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem [Gib73, Sat75] and Arrow’s impossibility theorem [Arr50].
Respectively, these theorems state that no reasonable voting system
is impossible to manipulate, and that none can have certain proper-
ties generally regarded as desirable. Likewise, in the case of control,
generally speaking immunity only occurs when it is fundamental to
the system under consideration; we discuss several specific examples in
Chapter 3, but few if any practical voting systems are immune to every
means of control.
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Thus, at best we can seek to find a voting system for which control
and manipulation are either impossible to accomplish in certain cases
or computationally infeasible to determine how to accomplish (for ex-
ample, we might seek to design an election in which deciding whether
control can be exercised at all is an NP-complete problem, a property
termed resistance).
A somewhat common objection to the use of complexity theory in
evaluating voting systems is that in many cases it becomes more rele-
vant for large, even unbounded, numbers of candidates. While terms
such as “voting system” suggest political elections, as we previously
touch upon it is also often the case that groups must choose between
different opinions and recommendations in other contests. For exam-
ple, a financial professional may have to decide between thousands of
possible stock and bond purchases (“candidates”), each of which may
be ranked differently by each of dozens or hundreds of experts and com-
puter programs (“voters”). In these settings, it is reasonable to speak
of an “election” of arbitrary numbers of candidates (and perhaps rela-
tively few voters).
Along the same lines, in artificial intelligence applications, we may
utilize voting systems to make decisions. For example, Jeong et al.
propose a Borda count variant to combine the results of using three
features in an image retrieval system, and in their trials achieve better
results than those of systems using any one feature [JKC99]. Likewise,
Richards and Seung propose applying Borda count and Condorcet elec-
tions to improve robustness in a certain type of neural networks [RS04].
Dwork, Kumar, Naor, and Sivakumar [DKNS01] propose the use of
voting to combine search results from the Web (with a particular em-
phasis on combating attempted spam). Many search engines exist, each
with a different method of ranking results. Some of the search engines
are more or less subject, as might be expected, to influence by various
spam techniques (and some allow paid inclusion, which may subvert
the algorithmic rankings). The authors suggest applying social choice
theory (including voting) to aggregate the results from various search
engines, and mention the use of various voting systems, including the
Condorcet and Borda systems.
The Borda count has been lauded for having a lower tendency to-
wards the spoiler effect than plurality voting does. In other words, a
weak candidate is less likely to lose the election for a similar strong
candidate, since the weak candidate will be drawing away high prefer-
ences, rather than entire votes as in a plurality election (in other words,
a voter who votes for the weak candidate first is likely to also rank the
similar strong candidate relatively high, and will still be helping both).
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Plurality voting can have problems not only with the spoiler effect, but
with vote-splitting between similar strong candidates. For example, in
the 2006 Canadian federal elections, the Conservative party gained con-
trol with only 36% of the vote [CBC06]. The conservatives were (and
are) the only strong right-leaning party, whereas there are two, or pos-
sibly three, liberal parties, depending on classification, and votes were
split between these.
As we will discuss in greater detail later, the Borda count is not only
not affected by the spoiler effect, but in a sense exhibits it in reverse.
More specifically, in many situations the “best” of a large number of
similar candidates is far better off than he or she would be if none of
the others ran (essentially, he or she will be ranked second by the voters
for the other strong candidate, and the later will be ranked last by the
supporters of the group of similar candidates).
In addition, since the Borda count considers a voter’s entire prefer-
ence list, a voter who knows that many other voters will vote for two
“strong” candidates is able to benefit by ranking his or her favored one
of the strong candidates first and the other last, even if he or she might
honestly rank them (e.g.) third and fourth respectively. This allows
him or her to have a much greater influence on the race between the
two strong candidates than if he or she voted honestly (in the example
given, if the election has ten candidates total, the manipulating voter
will contribute nine points to the race between the strong candidates,
rather than only one).
The Borda count has a long history of use in various settings. Par-
ticularly, it is used in parliamentary elections and in nomination of
candidates for President in the Pacific island nations of Nauru and
Kiribati, respectively [Rei02]. It is (perhaps inaccurately) named af-
ter Jean-Charles de Borda, who independently developed it in 1770,
though similar systems had been proposed by others (including one
that was used in the Roman senate [Str80], and another proposed by
Nicolaus Casanus in the 13th century to elect the Holy Roman Emperor
[ML06]).
We note in passing that there are other ways to apply complex-
ity theory to elections, aside from considering ease of interference (of
whatever type). For example, Conitzer and Sandholm [CS05] consider
the amount of communication capacity needed to gather information
from the voters to determine the results of an election, and point out
that attempting to use minimal communication may allow voters to
maintain some privacy or to compute only part of their preferences
(which may be expensive to fully compute). They find that the Borda
count has one of the higher requirements for communication capacity;
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perhaps unsurprisingly, plurality voting (which takes into account only
the first preference) has the lowest of all.

CHAPTER 2
Definitions
2.1. Elections in General
Formally, following [BTT92], we let an election consist of a set V
of voters, each identified with a preference order, a strict, complete and
transitive order on the set C of candidates.
As mentioned in the introduction, elections can be conducted using
any of several voting systems. For example, many political elections in
the world use plurality voting, in which voters vote only for a single
candidate, their first preference. The candidate who is voted for by the
greatest number of voters is the winner. In another system, approval
voting, each voter either approves or disapproves of each candidate.
The candidate of whom the largest number of voters approve is the
winner. We do not go into much detail about specific voting systems
where it is not relevant, but it is important to note that dozens of
systems exist, and a fair number are in practical use for one purpose
or another.
In a Borda count election, which is the focus of the present thesis,
each of the candidates is given ‖C‖ − n points for each voter who
ranks him or her in nth place (so, ‖C‖− 1 points for first, ‖C‖− 2 for
second, and so forth until the candidate a voter ranked last receives
no points). In weighted elections, some voters may count more than
others (for example, some voters’ preferences might count for double
points); more precisely, each voter is associated with a weight, and
contributes a number of points to each candidate equal to the product
of the weight and the number of points that would be given in an
unweighted election. Weighted elections achieve real-world significance
in certain non-political settings. For example, when shareholders vote
for a corporate board, their votes may be weighted in proportion to the
number of shares owned. Likewise, in certain committees, delegates
may have votes proportionate to the number of people they represent.
In the system used in Nauru, the number of points assigned for
consecutive preferences decreases hyperbolically rather than linearly; 1
point is assigned for the first preference, 1/2 for the second, 1/3 for the
third, and so forth [Rei02]. This embodies the plausible assumption,
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in the case of political elections, that voters may strongly prefer their
first one or two choices, but not be familiar with, or feel more or less
neutral towards, others.
As a basic example of a Borda count election utilizing the Borda
rule, consider three candidates, a, b, and c, and four voters, with re-
spective preference orders a > b > c, a > c > b, c > b > a, and
c > a > b. Candidate a is ranked first twice, second once, and third
once, and so is given 2 + 2 + 1 + 0 = 5 points. Candidate b, ranked
second twice and third twice, is given two points, and candidate c earns
five. At this point, candidates a and c are tied for winner.
In formalizing the problem, the input can be thought of as a list of
voter’s preference orders much like that above. This means that the
input length is proportionate to the product of the numbers of voters
and candidates.
The Borda count may be formulated in other ways. For example,
in an alternative formulation used by among others Straffin [Str80],
the first candidate in a preference order may be given n points and the
last one. It is immediate that changing from our method to this one
takes an equal number of points from each candidate, not changing the
result, and so the two are equivalent: in either, the candidate with the
most total points becomes the winner, and the identity of the winner
will be unchanged..
In the case of a weighted election, each voter is associated with a
positive integer “weight,” assumed to be expressed in binary or some
other reasonable representation. Before the computation of the final
result, the points awarded by each voter are multiplied by that voter’s
weight (hence, a voter with power n has the same power as n voters
each with power one). Clearly, an unweighted election is equivalent to
a weighted election in which all weights are equal to one.
In some unweighted elections, and particularly where the number
of voters is much greater than the number of candidates, many vot-
ers may have identical preference orders (in fact, when the disparity
is great, the pigeonhole principle may require them to do so). In
this case, it may make sense to think of the voters as represented
in a succinct representation. Succinct representations are discussed
by [FHH06] among others, though it is unclear where the concept
originated. In such a representation, the preference order is stated
once, along with the number of voters sharing that order. We assume
that the number of voters is expressed in binary or some other rea-
sonable representation. For example, we could have an input such as
3567xa > b > c; 521xb > c > a; 293xc > a > b to represent 3567 vot-
ers, each with preference order a > b > c, and likewise for the other
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entries. In the case where there is a small number of distinct prefer-
ences compared to the number of voters, this may render the control
problem asymptotically more difficult (potentially turning vulnerabil-
ity into resistance in some cases), since a short segment of the succinct
input may represent an exponential number of identical voters.
Control problems for succinct representations are fundamentally
different from those for weighted elections, and different methods must
be used in evaluating them. In the case of a succinct representation,
it is possible to add or delete some identical voters, but not others.
Conversely, in the case of weighted voters, we assume that each indi-
vidual voter must either cast a vote with their full weight, or not vote
(not making this assumption, of course, renders much of the difference
unimportant—in addition, it is difficult to imagine a practical mech-
anism for control that would remain undetected while allowing only
part of a vote to be cast and counted).
Typically, non-succinct representations are discussed; there is a
good practical reason for this. In a political election, or even in many
AI applications, ballots are submitted individually. This means that
even reading the ballots will take time proportionate to the product of
the number of voters and the length of each ballot. In few practical
cases would it be possible to determine voter preferences any faster
than that, much less exponentially faster.
That said, succinct representations are potentially relevant to real-
world political elections, which often have relatively few candidates, but
potentially tens or hundreds of millions of voters, many of whom will
share a preference order due to the pigeonhole principle alone. Often,
at least portions of the preference order of voters will be deducible
from such data as party memberships. In such cases, it is possible
that an election chair who is able to determine if control is possible
in time polynomial in a standard input length would find that it was
not feasible to do so on a real computer. On the other hand, control
problems requiring time which is polynomial in the length of a succinct
representation might remain easy. That said, the control algorithms we
present are generally relatively efficient, and in some cases they could
likely be made even more efficient by allowing approximate solutions.
In any case, the succinct representation case remains of theoretical
interest, especially since it expresses the notion that in control of very
large elections it may not be feasible to consider voters individually.
A property of the Borda count is that it encourages compromise.
In, for example, a four-candidate race, a candidate who is loved by half
the voters, and loathed by the other half, will lose to a candidate who
is the second choice of almost everyone. In fact, as Straffin points out
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[Str80], the (unweighted) Borda count effectively ranks candidates by
their average ranking among all voters, rather than by the number of
voters who rank them first. Whether favoring moderate candidates is a
desirable property is a philosophical question which we do not attempt
to address.
Consistent with the literature, we use the term control to mean
interference with the election from outside (for example, by a chair’s
decision to disqualify specific candidates), and manipulation to mean
interference by voters (for example, tactical voting, in which voters do
not express their true preferences, and thereby achieve a more favor-
able result from the perspective of those preferences than if they did)
[BTT92, HHR07a, CLS07]. A third possible method, bribery, has
recently been considered [FHH06].
Applying complexity theory to the difficulty of controlling elections
is an approach which was first introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [BTT92]. They consider attempts by an election’s chair to
control the plurality and Condorcet voting systems by a variety of
possible means. The use of the term “destructive” for manipulation
aimed at causing a candidate to lose was introduced by Conitzer, Lang,
and Sandholm [CLS03]. Destructive control was then considered by
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe, who also analyzed approval
voting as well as the influence of tie-breaking systems for certain spe-
cific means of control [HHR07a]. We follow the prior use of the terms
constructive and destructive control; in the former, the chair attempts
to ensure that a specified candidate is the unique winner, while in the
later he or she attempts to ensure that a specified candidate is not the
unique winner, in both cases after breaking any ties that may occur in
sub-elections; more formal definitions follow.
Following prior work, we consider an election to consist of a set of
voters V , each of whom has a preference order on the candidate set C.
Following [BTT92] in particular, we assume that all preference orders
are transitive, complete, and strict (less formally, each voter must un-
ambiguously rank every candidate, without tied preferences, and the
order must be transitive, which any ordinary “list” of preferences would
inevitably be). In addition, we consider only the order of preferences,
not “how much” voters prefer candidates to each other. There may
be situations where a voter despises his or her third-ranked of three
candidates, but only slightly prefers his or her first to his or her second
(or, conversely, greatly prefers the first to both the second and third,
but does not feel a strong distinction between those two). No common
variant of the Borda count takes this sort of variability of preferences
into account.
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Briefly, we consider control by means of adding or deleting either
voters or candidates, as well as by partition of the candidate or voter
set into sub-elections. These means of control are defined formally in
Section 2 of this chapter. Where sub-elections are considered, occa-
sionally a sub-election will end in a tie. In this case, there are two
possible ways to proceed, as discussed by [HHR07a]. In model ties
eliminate, all tied candidates are eliminated from the election; in model
ties promote, all are advanced to the next round.
In order to simplify proofs, we introduce the notion of a score func-
tion:
Definition 2.1.1. For all voters v and all candidates c, we define
score(c, v) as the number of points which c gains from v’s vote (in
other words, the difference between the total number of candidates
and the ordinal at which v ranks c). In the case of a weighted election,
score(c, v) is multiplied by v’s weight.
In some cases it is also useful to speak of preference distance, infor-
mally how much a voter prefers one candidate to another. Thanks to
the definition of the score function, this definition takes the weight of
the voter into account.
Definition 2.1.2. For all voters v and candidates c and d, we define
prefdist(c, d, v) to be score(c, v) - score(d, v), that is, the number of
places, adjusted for weight, by which v ranks c above d.
2.2. Means of control to be considered
These formal definitions are taken, with minor clarifications and
rephrasing, from the definitions used in [BTT92] and [HHR07a]. One
change we make to some of these definitions is to ask whether a change
of no more than k voters or candidates suffices to establish control.
This formulation more naturally incorporates the notion that in some
cases the chair may wish to make a relatively small change to reduce
the likelihood of apprehension. Additionally, it could allow future work
to consider whether control methods in which a change affects a small
number of voters or candidates (for example, a change to no more than
the square root of the original total) maintain the same computational
properties. If we wish to consider all possible changes, k can be set to
a sufficiently high value to allow this, and we can use these definitions
as given.
In the case of weighted elections, we assume that k is the total
weight of voters with which we are allowed to interfere (and not the
number of voters).
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Again, we speak of unique winners. Many if not all of our results
hold whether or not winners are required to be unique, and we specify
when a result holds for winners allowed to be non-unique.
2.2.1. Alteration of the Voter Set. First, we consider altering
the set of voters. Perhaps most obviously, we could persuade some
voters who are not presently registered to do so, and to vote.
Definition 2.2.1. Control by Adding Voters
Given: A set of candidates C and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C,
a set V of registered voters, an additional set W of yet unregistered
voters (both V andW having preferences over C), and a positive integer
k < ||W ||.
Question (constructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters from
W (in the weighted case, a set of voters with total weight at most k)
whose entry into the election would make c the unique winner?
Question (destructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters from
W (in the weighted case, a set of voters with total weight at most k)
whose entry into the election would prevent c from being the unique
winner?
We can also, of course, speak of deleting voters from those initially
registered. By deleting, we mean preventing them from voting (or, at
least, having their votes counted) by any means.
Definition 2.2.2. Control by Deleting Voters
Given: A set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a
set V of voters, and a positive integer k < ||V ||.
Question (constructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters in
V (in the weighted case, a set of voters with total weight at most k)
whose removal from the election would make c the unique winner?
Question (destructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters in
V (in the weighted case, a set of voters with total weight at most k)
whose removal from the election would prevent c from being the unique
winner?
Finally, we might, without adding or deleting voters, partition the
voters into sub-elections. Some (possibly empty) set of candidates will
win the sub-elections. We can then hold an election among those can-
didates, with all voters participating, and declare the winners of that
election to win.
Definition 2.2.3. Control by Partition of Voters
Given: A set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C,
and a set V of voters.
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Question (constructive): Is there a partition of V into V1 and V2
such that c is the unique winner in the hierarchical two-stage election
in which the survivors of (C, V1) and (C, V2) run against each other
with voter set V ?
Question (destructive): Is there a partition of V into V1 and
V2 such that c is not the unique winner in the hierarchical two-stage
election in which the survivors of (C, V1) and (C, V2) run against each
other with voter set V ?
Of course, in considering partition of voters, we have to deal with
handling ties among winners of sub-elections. Following [HHR07a], we
consider two common-sense alternatives, which were informally men-
tioned earlier. Firstly, we could decide that if there is a tie in a sub-
election, all tied candidates are eliminated and any winner comes from
the other sub-election.
Definition 2.2.4. In model Ties-Eliminate (TE), all tied candi-
dates in a sub-election are eliminated.
Of course, we may not want to eliminate candidates who were one
winner of a sub-election.
Definition 2.2.5. In model Ties-Promote (TP), all tied candidates
in a sub-election proceed to the next round.
2.2.2. Alteration of the Candidate Set. Now we arrive at the
problems relating to altering the candidate set, rather than the voter
set. One possibility is to add new candidates, perhaps in the hopes
of displacing the preferred candidate upwards in the voters’ reported
preference lists. We begin with adding candidates who are not presently
running.
Definition 2.2.6. Control by Adding Candidates
Given: A set C of qualified candidates and a distinguished candi-
date c ∈ C, a set B of presently non-participating candidates, a set V
of voters with preferences over C
⋃
B, and a positive integer k < ‖B‖
of allowed additional candidates.
Question (constructive): Is there a choice of no more than k
candidates from B whose entry into the election would make c the
unique winner?
Question (destructive): Is there a choice of no more than k
candidates from B whose entry into the election would prevent c from
being the unique winner?
Alternatively, we may instead delete candidates whose presence may
be preventing the desired result. Following [HHR07a], we do not allow
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deleting the distinguished candidate in destructive control, since this
would make the control problem trivial.
Definition 2.2.7. Control by Deleting Candidates
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a
set V of voters, and a positive integer k < ||C|| of allowed deletions.
Question (constructive): Are there k or fewer candidates in C
whose disqualification would make c the unique winner?
Question (destructive): Are there k or fewer candidates in C,
excluding c, whose disqualification would prevent c from being the
unique winner?
We could also consider having two elections, in which one set of
candidates first compete for the right to meet a second set of candi-
dates.
Definition 2.2.8. Control by Partition of Candidates
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C,
and a set V of voters.
Question (constructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and
C2 such that c is the unique winner in the sequential two-stage election
in which the winners in the sub-election (C1, V ) who survive the tie-
handling rule move forward to face the candidates in C2 (with voter
set V )?
Question (destructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and
C2 such that c is not the unique winner in the sequential two-stage
election in which the winners in the sub-election (C1, V ) who survive
the tie-handling rule move forward to face the candidates in C2 (with
voter set V )?
Rather than an election in which the first set of candidates must
run for the privilege of competing on equal footing with the second set,
it may make more sense to have two sub-elections the winners of which
then compete against one another.
Definition 2.2.9. Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C,
and a set V of voters.
Question (constructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and
C2 such that c is the unique winner in the election in which those can-
didates surviving (with respect to the tie-handling rule) sub-elections
on voter set V and respective candidate sets C1 and C2 have a runoff
with voter set V ?
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Question (destructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2
such that c is not the unique winner in the election in which those can-
didates surviving (with respect to the tie-handling rule) sub-elections
(C1, V ) and (C2, V ) have a runoff with voter set V ?

CHAPTER 3
Prior work
3.1. Manipulation
Manipulation, in contrast to control, is the practice of voters (either
individually or in cooperation) submitting votes which do not honestly
reflect their preferences in order to achieve an election outcome which
better fits those preferences than if they had voted honestly. Ideally,
we would want all elections to be impossible to manipulate as well as to
control. At least in the case of manipulation, as alluded to earlier, this
is not possible. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states, informally,
that in an election of three or more candidates, any voting system has
one of several properties [Gib73, Sat75]. The system must either be
dictatorial, in other words have some voter who is solely in control of
the outcome, have some candidate who can never win (thus, effectively
have a smaller number of candidates) or be susceptible to manipulation
(that is, have a scenario in which a voter with total knowledge of other
voters’ preferences will have an incentive to vote dishonestly). This is
paraphrased from the formulation used by [CLS07]; several alternate
formulations exist.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem can be generalized as well. For
example, Aswal, Chatterji and Sen show that any non-manipulable
social choice function defined on certain “linked domains” must be
dictatorial [ACS03].
This inevitable potential for strategic voting, in addition to allow-
ing voters to have more influence than they “should” in view of their
respective weights, can pose a practical problem in that, if many voters
vote dishonestly, there may be outcomes that few if any voters actually
would desire. For example, in the realistic case of incomplete informa-
tion, we can imagine a plurality election in which a candidate believed
to be strong is actually the first preference of relatively few voters, but
is elected thanks to strategic voters who vote for him or her rather than
their first choice, who they believe cannot win. In the case of the Borda
count, even with complete information, there is a strong incentive to
“bury” a candidate whom a voter dislikes and expects to win.
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In general, the Borda count is widely known to have poor properties
against manipulation, and particularly against tactical voting; not only
is manipulation possible, but in many cases determining a manipulation
strategy is an easy task [Ser02]. As a simple example, consider a four-
candidate election in which a dishonest voter prefers a > b > c > d. If
the voter in question knows that b and c are liked by a large proportion
of the other voters, and as such are the only candidates with a real
possibility of winning, he or she will want to have the maximum possible
impact on the race between them. In this scenario, he or she can vote
b > a > d > c, and thereby give b an edge of three points in the b
vs. c race, instead of only one point if he or she had voted honestly.
Interestingly, however, Barbie, Puppe, and Tasna´di find that the Borda
count for preference sets that satisfy certain criteria is strategy-proof.
[BPT06]
It is fair to note that similar concerns apply to plurality voting, in
which not voting for a favored weak candidate may be advantageous—
but in a plurality election, clearly, a voter can help only one candidate,
whereas a manipulative voter in a Borda count election may be able to
over-rank several preferred candidates as well as burying several strong
candidates below weak candidates who he or she may dislike even more.
Of course, even though manipulation is in a certain sense inevitable,
we can still attempt to make it as difficult as possible (for example, by
making it an NP-complete problem to determine whether manipulation
by a specific group of voters is possible; as in the case of control, this
property is termed “resistance”).
Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang consider the manipulation of few-
candidate elections [CLS07]. In addition to the Borda count, they
consider the plurality, Condorcet, and single transferable vote systems,
as well as others which we do not discuss. Conitzer, Sandholm, and
Lang additionally consider the number of candidates needed before an
election gains resistance in those cases in which it is possible at all.
Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang make an assumption (somewhat ir-
relevant when considering control of elections with honest voters, but
significant when considering manipulation) that voters must submit
their entire preference sets up front, and may not change them once
submitted, even when an election has multiple rounds. They consider
manipulation both in the case in which the manipulating voters have
complete information about the preferences of non-manipulators, and
in that in which they do not. They also consider other variations. For
example, voters may be weighted or unweighted, and may be trying to
manipulate constructively or destructively, either as individuals or as
a coalition. One interesting result is that when manipulation is hard
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for coalitions with complete information, it is also hard for individuals
with incomplete information.
In some cases manipulation is easy. For example, constructive ma-
nipulation of a plurality election requires us to compute whether the
preferred candidate wins in the event that every manipulator votes for
that candidate. If this is the case, then the manipulators can clearly do
no better if they vote in any other way. A positional scoring protocol
is one in which two conditions are true. Firstly, candidates receive,
for each integer n no greater than the number of candidates, a fixed
number of points for being ranked nth by any voter. Secondly, the
sequence of point values is non-increasing (being ranked early is no
worse than being ranked late). The Borda count, when restricted to a
fixed number of candidates, is a positional scoring protocol. Conitzer,
Sandholm, and Lang find that, with the exception of plurality voting,
all such protocols for weighted elections are resistant to constructive
manipulation by coalitions even with only three candidates.
Further, [CLS07] find that for all voting systems in which candi-
dates are scored based on the votes, and in which the score function is
monotone (that is, for a voter to change his or her vote to rank a candi-
date higher does not hurt that candidate), a group which includes the
Borda count, destructive manipulation of weighted elections by coali-
tions of voters is in P. This is true because, if there is a manipulation
to make the distinguished candidate lose, there must be one in which
every manipulator ranks the same candidate first and ranks the dis-
tinguished candidate last; such a manipulation helps the first-ranked
candidate as much as possible against the distinguished candidate. It
is easy to determine the result of manipulation if every manipulator
uses votes of that form, and try doing so for each possible first-ranked
candidate.
Campbell and Kelly consider a class of “social welfare functions”
which generate social choice rules (i.e., voting systems) which are com-
pletely immune to manipulation when certain conditions hold regarding
the initial election [CK06]. The authors begin with what they term
the “folk theorem:” in Condorcet elections, when a Condorcet winner
exists, for any given non-winning candidate, each manipulator either
prefers the winner to that candidate, or not. If a manipulator prefers
the current winner, he or she will vote honestly and rank the current
winner earlier, thereby not changing the result to favor the candidate
under consideration. If he or she prefers the candidate under con-
sideration, he or she will rank that candidate first even when voting
honestly. As such, in either case, manipulation by that voter will not
make some non-winning candidate the unique Condorcet winner, again
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assuming that such a winner existed initially (note that the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem does not set any conditions on the outcome of
the pre-manipulation election). Campbell and Kelly extend this result
to certain other systems.
The Borda count is vulnerable to destructive manipulation, that
is, the manipulation problem is polynomial, as shown by [CLS07].
However, as previously noted, vulnerability applies to other common
voting systems (and particularly to the commonly used plurality sys-
tem, which in fact is even more trivial to manipulate). In fact, again,
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem implies that any reasonable voting
system can be manipulated (though it may be resistant in some or all
cases). We need to consider other factors in deciding which system to
use in which situations.
3.2. Control
The intent of this thesis is to determine the computational com-
plexity of control of Borda count voting systems (weighted and other-
wise) through a variety of potential means of control, including some of
those considered for other voting systems in [BTT92] and [HHR07a]
(namely, control by addition and removal of candidates and voters,
partition of candidates, partition of voters, and runoff partition of can-
didates, though we do not find results for all these cases). Following
the reasoning of those papers, we aim to determine whether the Borda
Count is immune to exercising constructive and destructive control by
various means of control (it is fundamentally impossible to establish
control), is resistant to control (determining whether it is possible to es-
tablish control is NP-complete), or is vulnerable (determining whether
it is possible to establish control is in P).
Consistent with the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, and despite
the specific advantage of avoiding the spoiler effect, the Borda count is
vulnerable to certain other types of practical manipulation and control.
For example, Serais argues that a losing candidate may be able to win
by encouraging a similar candidate slightly weaker than herself to run
(the opposite of the outcome in plurality voting) [Ser02]. This practice
is referred to as cloning of candidates.
As an example of the risk from cloning, consider an election with
two candidates, a and b, and voters who are in favor of the two in equal
numbers (or equivalently, two voters with preference order a > b and
b > a). Clearly, the candidates are tied. Now let us introduce a new
candidate c, who is a clone of a, in other words ranked similarly by the
voters, so that all voters either prefer b to both a and c, or rank b after
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both. Further assume that c is less known than a, and so is ranked
behind him or her by all voters.
In the modified election, clearly, we will have half the voters with
preference order a > c > b and the other half with order b > a > c.
Here a clearly wins, and this result holds even if a small number of
voters have preferences inconsistent with the described properties. On
the other hand, if those properties hold for all voters, any two-candidate
election in which even one voter initially favors a can be controlled by
adding a sufficient number of clones of a to give a a large number
of points from that voter. Serais considers the situations in which the
Borda count may be controlled via cloning in much more detail [Ser02].
It appears that no work has been done specifically on computational
aspects of control of the Borda count (although there has been work
on manipulation and bribery). In particular, our concern will be with
the asymptotic difficulty of control of elections, even for an election ad-
ministrator with very great power (and knowledge of the preferences of
all voters). This contrasts with practical control, in which the concern
may be whether an election with a small number of candidates can
be controlled without discovery (though our notion of making at most
k changes covers this as well). We also consider elections in which
voters are weighted, or in which unweighted voters are expressed in
succinct representation. In the remainder of this section, all elections
are unweighted unless specified otherwise.
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick begin by making assumptions that they
state are conservative for real elections [BTT92]. For example, they
assume that an election’s chair is able to know each voter’s preferences
(for all candidates, presently eligible or not), and that the voters will
vote “sincerely”—that is, will not use manipulation strategies such as
tactical voting, individually or otherwise (we make the same assump-
tions). Additionally, they simplify their analysis by not considering tie-
handling rules. Section 2 of their paper is devoted to summarizing the
field of computational complexity, and particularly NP theory, however
one point of interest is that they introduce certain terminology relat-
ing to the computational difficulty of establishing control, specifically
the notions of immunity, susceptibility (non-immunity), resistance, and
vulnerability. As noted by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe
[HHR07a], for those systems which we discuss in depth and all those
discussed by [BTT92], the control problems for which resistance holds
are in fact NP-complete. This holds because it is easy to determine
the winner of these elections, and a nondeterministic control algorithm
can try each possible alteration to the election and check whether the
desired outcome is achieved.
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Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick go on to specify the means of con-
trol they will consider, which are among the constructive cases we
define in Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 3, namely addition and deletion of
voters, addition and deletion of candidates, and partition and runoff
partition of candidates. In every case, they limit themselves to what
others term constructive control—control in which the chair attempts
to make a specific “distinguished” non-winning candidate the unique
winner. In all cases, preferences are assumed to be constant - the set of
voters, presently registered or otherwise, is finite, and all voters have
a preference for all candidates, presently running or not, and will vote
honestly. This differs from the situation in which manipulation is con-
sidered, which requires its own set of assumptions (for example, the
assumption that all voter preferences are specified up front and cannot
be changed).
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick consider two voting systems. Plurality
voting, which is used in most elections in the United States and several
other countries, gives each voter one vote, which he or she is assumed
to cast for the most preferred candidate. The winner is simply the can-
didate who receives more votes than any other. The second system,
Condorcet voting, requires the winner to be preferred to every other
candidate by a majority of voters. This of course leads to a potential
pitfall in the system—in many cases there will not be a winner at all,
the so-called Condorcet paradox. As a simple example, if there are 3
candidates a, b, and c, and 3 voters with preference orders a > b > c,
b > c > a, and c > a > b, then it is easy to verify that a is preferred to
c only once, b is preferred to a only once, and c is preferred to b only
once, so no candidate can win this Condorcet election. We do not go
into great detail regarding results specific to Condorcet voting. The
reason is that this system is essentially unlike both the Borda count
and plurality voting. As such, results related to the Condorcet sys-
tem often use methods not relevant to other systems. The Condorcet
system depends on pairwise comparisons by individual voters between
all candidates, not on exactly how the voters regard each candidate.
Conversely, the Borda count, like plurality voting, depends on a rank-
ing of all candidates, compiled from the voters’ preferences (both are
scoring protocols when restricted to a fixed number of candidates; the
Condorcet system is not). These systems also always have a (possibly
not unique) winner. This contrasts with the Condorcet system, which
has no winners in many possible elections (a simple example being the
election earlier in this paragraph).
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick show that plurality voting is compu-
tationally resistant to constructive control by adding candidates. This
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is done by reduction from the NP-complete hitting set problem, which
informally requires determining whether, given a finite set and a set of
its subsets, it is possible to choose a subset of less than a specified size
such that it shares at least one element with every given subset. Briefly,
the reduction is done by creating a correspondence between voters and
set members. This is done in such a way that the preferred candidate
wins ground against the original winner for each subset a member of
which is chosen, but loses ground against another opponent every time
any set item is chosen. By setting the voter preferences properly, it is
possible to construct an election in which control is possible if and only
if the appropriate hitting set exists.
Likewise, [BTT92] find that plurality voting is computationally
resistant to control by deleting candidates. This is shown by reduction
from exact cover by 3-sets, an NP-complete problem which involves
determining whether, given a set B whose size is divisible by 3 and
a collection S of 3-element subsets of B, a set S ′ of subsets of S can
be chosen such that each element of B appears in exactly one element
of S ′. The authors design an election such that, if manipulation by
deleting candidates is possible, an exact cover exists. This involves an
intricate balancing of votes won and lost by various candidates. The
preferred candidate gains exactly one vote for each member added to
the covering set, gaining enough votes to win if and only if each subset
is covered. If an element of B is chosen more than once, a non-preferred
candidate will gain enough votes to win, and the same will happen if
there is no cover.
[BTT92] find plurality voting to be resistant to control by parti-
tion of candidates as well as runoff partition of candidates. The runoff
partition case is done by reducing to the problem of control by deleting
candidates. While intricate, the transformation is somewhat intuitive,
since the favored candidate can only win if the earlier round in which
he or she does not take part places a set of candidates against whom
he or she can win in the runoff. The case of partition of candidates is
proved by adding filler candidates to the previously constructed runoff
partition case, and showing that it is still necessary to solve the orig-
inal deletion problem in order to exercise control over the election by
partition of candidates.
Plurality voting is computationally vulnerable to control by adding
and by deleting voters. Essentially, this is true because it considers only
each voter’s favorite candidate. This means that it is easy to see which
voters should be added to help the preferred candidate, or deleted to
hurt those candidates who are presently beating him or her.
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Plurality voting is computationally vulnerable to control by parti-
tion of voters. If any candidate will lose to the preferred candidate c,
there is a candidate c′ who is the strongest of those who do so. Now,
if there is no candidate who defeats c and c′ combined by a margin
of than two votes, it is possible to assign the voters for c and c′ to
separate partitions, and then to partition the remaining voters so that
no candidate beats the current winners in their respective partitions.
This allows c to face and defeat c′ in the final election.
One significant result mentioned in [BTT92] is the Weak Axiom
of Revealed Preference (WARP), which is true of voting systems in
which the winner of an election is always the winner of every subset
of candidates containing him or her. In voting systems which satisfy
WARP, constructive control by adding candidates is impossible—any
original candidate who will win an augmented election must have been
winning already. This is true, for example, of Condorcet elections, since
the winner must be preferred by a majority to every candidate in the
set, and so to every candidate in his or her subset. It is not, however,
true of plurality voting. It is quite possible that, in a plurality election,
the winner does not win among a subset of candidates because voters
who would be spread between candidates outside the subset instead
vote for a less-preferred candidate, giving that candidate enough votes
to defeat the winner of the augmented election.
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe introduce a notion of a
system being computationally vulnerable to a specific method of con-
trol, which means that not only does the polynomial algorithm decide
whether control is possible, but it tells the chair exactly how to go
about establishing control whenever it is [HHR07a]. There are few if
any practical examples in which a voting system in which recognizing
winners is in P is vulnerable, but not computationally vulnerable. In
any event, [HHR07a] prove computational vulnerability in every case
in which they prove vulnerability.
In passing, we note that voting systems do exist in which deter-
mining the winner is an NP-hard problem. These include the Dodg-
son, Kemeny, and Young systems, all essentially variants on Condorcet
voting. The first two systems were shown to have NP-hard winner-
determination problems by [BTT89], and the second by [RSV03].
Clearly, such systems, while often interesting, are impractical for real
elections.
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe additionally introduce,
as previously mentioned, the notion of destructive control. In some
real-world situations, the chair may not have a strong preference for
who wins, as long as a specific despised candidate loses. This may
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free the chair to not consider interactions between multiple candidates,
making the control problem easier. In fact, when determining win-
ners is in P, it is impossible for a system to be resistant to destructive
control unless it is also resistant to constructive control. This is true
because determining whether destructive control is possible is the same
as determining whether constructive control is possible for some non-
distinguished candidate (who will thus become a winner, making the
distinguished candidate not the unique winner). As a special case,
destructive control by deleting candidates does not allow the chair to
delete the distinguished candidate (thus preventing a trivial, uninter-
esting method of control).
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe consider three voting
systems: plurality, approval, and Condorcet voting. We will not further
discuss Condorcet voting, simply because plurality voting more closely
resembles the Borda count, and it is reasonable to assume that that
results regarding plurality voting will be more often directly useful in
analyzing the Borda case. In addition, we do not go into much detail
regarding the constructive results for the case of approval voting, which
is first considered by [HHR07a]; the arguments used to show these
results are often intricate and not easily applicable to the Borda count,
and in many cases immunity trivially holds, which is likewise not the
case for the Borda count.
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe begin by showing sus-
ceptibility in many cases. Often, this is proved by finding a small
election in which a change allowed by the means of control in ques-
tion changes the winner. We will not discuss these proofs in general;
when we mention resistance or vulnerability, it implies susceptibility.
Immunity, generally speaking, is found in cases in which the voting
system in question has fundamental properties preventing it from be-
ing possible to control. For example, Condorcet voting is immune to
destructive control by deleting candidates for the simple reason that it
satisfies unique-WARP (the version of WARP considering unique win-
ners), and so if the despised candidate wins the original election, he or
she will win an election among any subset containing him or her. As
previously mentioned, deleting the despised candidate is not allowed as
it would permit trivial control by deleting candidates, and so any sub-
set of remaining candidates must contain the distinguished candidate;
due to unique-WARP, the distinguished candidate will still win among
this subset.
[HHR07a] find approval voting to be immune to destructive con-
trol by deletion of candidates, partition of candidates, and runoff parti-
tion of candidates. This is true because it fulfills the version of WARP
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(as defined earlier) for unique winners, and so the chosen candidate
must be winner in any subset containing him or her—and thus must
win the final election, as well as the sub-elections involved in the parti-
tion methods. Interestingly, no immunity results are found for plurality
voting at all (which supports our intuition that none exist for the sim-
ilar Borda count).
Approval voting is computationally vulnerable to destructive con-
trol by partition of voters regardless of tie-handling rules. [HHR07a]
consider two tie-breaking models, Ties-Eliminate and Ties-Promote, as
defined previously. As in many such cases, if the distinguished candi-
date c already is not the unique winner, control is trivially possible by
leaving one partition empty. If there are exactly one or two candidates,
it is impossible to change the winner by partition of voters, so con-
trol is possible or impossible depending on whether the distinguished
candidate presently is the unique winner. In the case of model Ties-
Eliminate, they go on to consider whether some two non-distinguished
candidates can be made to each tie or beat c in one partition. This
is done by allocating voters who approve of each intended winner to
that winner’s partition, using arithmetical reasoning to ensure that this
strategy can succeed for the pair of candidates in question (and contin-
uing to search pairs if not). If no such pair exists, control is impossible.
In model Ties-Promote, similar reasoning is used, except that they en-
sure that the the intended winners strictly defeat c in each partition.
This is important since at this point in the algorithm, c is known to
be the original winner, and since relative standings in approval voting
do not depend on the candidate set chosen, c would still be the final
winner if not prevented from winning in either partition (this is also the
case in model Ties-Eliminate, but there of course a tied result suffices
to ensure that c does not reach the final round).
Approval voting is computationally vulnerable to destructive con-
trol by deletion of voters. This is shown by reasoning very similar to
that for partition of voters; in the case of approval voting, for each
potential winner i, it is possible to count the number of voters who
approve of c but not of i. If the number of such voters is sufficient,
enough can be deleted to allow i to unseat c. In the related case of
addition of voters, [HHR07a] likewise propose adding enough eligible
voters who approve a chosen candidate, but not c. There are other de-
tails involved in their argument for both cases, which actually counts
voters for each candidate considered as a potential “unseater”; they do
not actually loop across all candidates, though such a strategy would
succeed.
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Plurality voting is computationally vulnerable to constructive as
well as destructive control by partition of voters in model Ties-Eliminate.
In the constructive case, [HHR07a] argue if the distinguished candi-
date can be made to win, this can be done in several ways. In the case
in which a partition contains no voters, clearly the winner remains the
winner of the original election, since all voters are in the second par-
tition. In the second case, where the distinguished candidate is nomi-
nated by both partitions, he or she is clearly also the overall winner. In
the third case, the distinguished candidate wins one sub-election while
the other produces no winner due to a tie involving the distinguished
candidate and one or more others. Since the distinguished candidate
wins one sub-election and ties the other, he or she must already win
the original election. If the distinguished candidate is not already the
winner, it is only necessary to determine whether one of two other
cases can be made to hold. Specifically, either the distinguished can-
didate can be made to win one of the two sub-elections and then win
the runoff, or can be made to win a sub-election, while the other sub-
election produces no winner due to a tie between non-distinguished
candidates.
In the destructive case under model Ties-Eliminate, plurality voting
is again vulnerable. As in all cases of destructive control, when the
distinguished candidate c is already not the unique winner, there is
a trivial solution. When he or she is the unique winner, and the two
next-highest candidates have vote totals which sum to at least that of c,
partitions can be arranged so that one of the two ties or beats c in each
partition. When this is not the case, c clearly must win in at least one
partition, but destructive control may still be possible. Essentially, the
method used in this case is to find some candidate who ties or defeats c
in a two-candidate plurality election, and who can be made to win the
second sub-election by assigning his or her opponents’ supporters to
the first partition. To be clear, such a candidate may exist even when
the distinguished candidate originally wins, because the candidate may
gain support in the final runoff by voters whose first choice (possibly
the distinguished candidate, possibly not) is not in that runoff. In this
case, control is possible if and only if such a candidate exists.
[HHR07a] use a single reduction in resistance results for partition
of voters in model Ties-Promote as well as other means of control for
plurality voting. In considering resistance results, they first establish a
rather broad result—if the winner of an election can be determined in
polynomial time (as is true in the Borda count), and a specific control
problem is NP-hard, the system cannot be immune to control by that
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means unless P=NP. This is true because if immunity holds, the deci-
sion problem is in P (it is easy to state that control is impossible for
any given case, if it is never possible). When the problem is already
known to be NP-hard, this of course implies that P=NP.
In the case of plurality voting, [HHR07a] use one reduction from
the Hitting Set problem for several cases in each of constructive and
destructive control. In the case of destructive control, the reduction
involves ensuring that the distinguished candidate loses ground to an-
other candidate for each set member added, but gains ground against a
third candidate when a set member is added. Given this construction,
relatively short arguments show that plurality elections are resistant
to destructive control by adding candidates, deleting candidates, par-
tition of candidates in both models Ties-Eliminate and Ties-Promote,
and runoff partition of candidates, again in both models.
For partition of voters, a separate reduction to a new problem,
Restricted Hitting Set, is used to show that plurality voting is resis-
tant to destructive as well as constructive control by this method in
model Ties-Promote. Other cases of constructive control were previ-
ously shown by [BTT92].
CHAPTER 4
Analysis of the Borda count
We consider the possible means of control one at a time, considering
constructive control, destructive control, or both (that is, both causing
a specified “distinguished” candidate to win, and causing that candi-
date to lose, following the terminology of [HHR07a]). We endeavor to
find general principles involved in control of the Borda count, and par-
ticularly a close relationship between this task and known NP-complete
problems to reduce the degree to which novel reasoning needed in spe-
cific proofs. In particular, we find that certain weighted problems
closely correspond with the partition problem, as has been previously
seen in other voting systems. It should be noted that in the case of con-
structive control by addition of weighted voters, our reasoning (while
arrived at independently) is very similar to that of Conitzer, Lang, and
Sandholm, who analyze the manipulation of few-candidate elections
(including Borda elections) [CLS07].
4.1. Addition and deletion of voters
4.1.1. Destructive control by addition and deletion of vot-
ers. Destructive control by adding and deleting voters is not difficult.
We must make sure that some candidate defeats the distinguished can-
didate, and can do this by first adding or deleting the voters who will
contribute the most to the goal. If deletion or addition of any voters
allow us to replace the winner with a given new candidate, those will.
Theorem 4.1.1. The unweighted Borda count is computationally
vulnerable to destructive control by adding and by deleting voters.
Proof. We show this result by presenting a polynomial-time algo-
rithm as follows:
To establish destructive control by deleting no more than k voters,
for each candidate c′ other than the distinguished candidate c:
• For each voter v in V , determine prefdist(c, c′, v) as defined in
Definition 2.1.2.
– Sort the voters by this distance.
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– Determine whether deleting the k voters with the largest
positive preference distance (or all, if there are fewer than
k with positive preference distance) suffices to allow c′ to
at least tie c.
• If that is true for some c′, output a set of voters to be deleted
for one such c′. If it is true for none, output control impossible.
In the case of addition of voters, a similar algorithm suffices. Again,
for each candidate c′ other than c:
• For each voter v in W , determine prefdist(c′, c, v) as defined
in Definition 2.1.2.
– Sort the voters by this distance.
– Determine whether adding the k voters with the largest
positive preference distance (or all, if there are fewer than
k with positive preference distance) suffices to allow c′ to
at least tie c.
• If that is true for some c′, output a set of voters to be added
for one such c′. If it is true for none, output control impossible.
We may note that each opposing candidate c′ can be considered sep-
arately, since in order for c to no longer be the unique winner some
such candidate must defeat him or her, and this is both a necessary
and a sufficient condition. Clearly, the algorithms run in polynomial
time. 
4.1.2. Constructive control by addition and deletion of un-
weighted voters. In the case of constructive control by addition of
unweighted voters, we observe that the control problem is hard because
adding a voter or voters may benefit some candidates while harming
others.
Theorem 4.1.2. The unweighted Borda count is resistant to con-
structive control by adding voters.
Proof. We show this by reduction from exact cover by 3-sets
(X3C). The X3C problem involves determining whether, given a set
S = {s1, s2, ..., s3n} for some integer n and a collection T = {T1, T2, ..., Tm}
of 3-elements subsets of S, T contains an exact cover for S, that is,
some subset of T whose elements collectively contain each member of
S exactly once (or, equivalently, so that every element of S appears in
exactly one element of T ). This problem is NP-complete as per [GJ79].
To begin with, if m is at least 3n2, we must pad S by adding triples
of new elements, each of which appear in exactly one new subset in T ,
untilm is less than 3n2. The reason for this transformation will become
4.1. ADDITION AND DELETION OF VOTERS 37
obvious later, but it is clear that it does not exponentially enlarge the
input, and will not change the existence of an exact cover.
When we refer to a set Ti within a preference order, we mean that
that set’s member candidates appear in the preference order at that
point in arbitrary order.
The candidate set C contains buffer candidates b1...b4‖S‖3 (that is,
a total of 4‖S‖3 buffer candidates), a candidate for each set member si
(which we also term si) and the distinguished candidate c. We will set
up the transformation such that the election is controllable when, and
only when, there is an exact cover. Note that ‖C‖ = 4‖S‖3 + ‖S‖+1.
The number of allowed additions, k, should be such that only the
appropriate number of 3-sets can be added, so we set k = n = ‖S‖
3
.
The set of presently qualified voters V includes several groups of
voters. The first group consists of 4‖S‖3 voters, half having preference
order
s1 > s2 > ... > s‖S‖ > c > b1 > b2 > ... > b4‖S‖3
and the other half with preference order
c > s‖S‖ > s‖S‖−1 > ... > s2 > s1 > b4‖S‖3 > b4‖S‖3−1 > ... > b2 > b1.
We note that the different ordering ensures that none of the si and
bi candidates has an advantage over any other member of the same
group, since the arithmetic means of the rankings within each group
are constant. More precisely, for each sj and each bl, each voter v
from the first group has prefdist(v, sj, bl) = ‖S‖ − j + 1 + l and each
voter from the second group has j + 4‖S‖3 − l. A pair of voters, one
from each group, combine to give each sj an advantage over each bl of
4‖S‖3+ ‖S‖+1, so all these voters combined give a total advantage of
8‖S‖6+2‖S‖4+2‖S‖3. This also leaves c tied with all the si candidates,
since c acts like an sj with j = 0 for the purpose of these calculations.
V additionally contains k − 1 voters whose purpose is to give c a
disadvantage relative to the s1 candidates. Of these voters, half have
preference order
s1 > s2 > ... > s‖S‖−1 > s‖S‖ > b1 > b2 > ... > b4‖S‖3−1 > b4‖S‖3 > c
and the other half have preference order
s‖S‖ > s‖S‖−1 > ... > s2 > s1 > b4‖S‖3 > b4‖S‖3−1 > ... > b2 > b1 > c.
We note that c is now behind each of the si candidates by a total of
(k − 1)(4‖S‖3) = (‖S‖
3
− 1)(4‖S‖3) = 4‖S‖
4
3
− 4‖S‖3.
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We set the set W of unqualified voters to contain one voter vi for
each set Ti in T , and each such voter has preference order
c > b1 > b2 > ... > b‖S‖3 > Ti > b2‖S‖3+1 > ... > b4‖S‖3 > S − Ti.
Adding one of these voters to the election will aid c by approximately
4‖S‖3 points over the candidates corresponding to S − Ti, but will
also give the candidates in Ti an advantage of approximately 3‖S‖3
points over those in S−Ti (the rough equivalence holds because buffer
candidates greatly outnumber all other candidates; we will show this
formally later).
We note again that, before any voters from V ′ are added to the
election, c is ahead of all the buffer candidates by 8‖S‖6+2‖S‖4+2‖S‖3
but is behind all of the si candidates by
4‖S‖4
3
−4‖S‖3. For any voter vj
inW , the si candidates which are not in the subset Tj corresponding to
that voter can gain no more than ‖S‖ (actually, no more than ‖S‖−3)
points relative to one another as a result of vj’s vote. From all these
voters combined, no si candidate can gain more than m‖S‖ points
beyond the 3‖S‖3 it gains when chosen. This means that no such
candidate can reach the total “offset” of ‖S‖3 needed to defeat c when
a correct cover is chosen, or to fail to defeat c when one is not chosen,
as long as m is less than ‖S‖2. That inequality is guaranteed by the
padding performed at the beginning of this proof. This justifies our
statement that we can speak approximately about the number of points
given to the “unchosen” si by voters from W and the correctness of
the reduction will not be affected, so long as all margins of victory are
at least ‖S‖3.
Additionally, we note that no buffer candidate can ever win: their
disadvantage of 8‖S‖6 + 2‖S‖4 + 2‖S‖3 points is far too large for any
points given by voters in W to overcome.
We are now ready to prove this theorem. To begin with, we show
that that the existence of an exact cover of size ‖S‖
3
= k implies that
control is possible. To exert control, we add the voters corresponding
to the members of the cover, thereby adding k · ‖C‖, or (within the
approximation bounds described above) 4‖S‖
4
3
, points to c and (to the
same approximation) 3‖C‖
4
, or 3‖S‖3, to each si (depending on the order
of candidates within the subset). But c had an initial disadvantage of
only 4‖S‖
4
3
− 4‖S‖3 points, and is now ahead of each other candidate.
On the other hand, if no exact cover exists, control is impossible.
If we attempt to choose a number x fewer than k voters to add, then c
gains 4x‖S‖3 points, while each si whose subset is chosen gains 3‖S‖3.
Since the si whose subsets are chosen had an initial advantage over c
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of 4‖S‖
4
3
− 4‖S‖3 points, and x is at most k− 1 = ‖S‖
3
− 1, c can gain at
most 4‖S‖
4
3
− 4‖S‖3 points, and cannot win; he or she is behind each of
those si by 3‖S‖3 points.
If we choose k voters, but choose a set of additions corresponding
to adding more than one subset containing some element sj, in other
words hitting sj more than once, sj will gain at least 6‖S‖3 points from
these additions and again will defeat c. 
Finally, we note that this reasoning holds whether we consider
unique winners, or a winner, as the standard of victory for the election.
The large number of buffer candidates ensures that any addition of a
voter makes c either win or not win; no ties are possible.
The above result aside, we can solve the control problem for small
numbers of candidates. More specifically:
Theorem 4.1.3. The unweighted Borda count is computationally
vulnerable to constructive control by adding or deleting voters for elec-
tions of three candidates.
Proof. The control algorithm proceeds as follows:
• Sort the voters into three categories: Category 1 is those who
rank the distinguished candidate first, category 2 being those
who rank the distinguished candidate second, and category 3
being those who rank the distinguished candidate last.
• Without exceeding k, add as many non-qualified voters of cat-
egory 1 in the adding voters case, or delete as many qualified
voters of category 3 in the deleting voters case, as possible.
• If there are additions or removals left, and exactly one candi-
date leads or ties the distinguished candidate, add or remove
voters from category 2 to the extent necessary to make the dis-
tinguished candidate strictly defeat that candidate. (We note
that if the distinguished candidate is last at the beginning of
this phase, nothing can be done as any change to category 2
voters will help one non-distinguished candidate and hurt the
other equally).
• If the distinguished candidate is now the unique winner, con-
trol is possible; output the list of voters to be deleted or added.
Otherwise, it is impossible; output accordingly.

While this explicit algorithm works for the case of three candidates,
it is important to note that for any bounded number of candidates, and
unweighted voters, there will be a constant number of unique voters,
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since the number of possible preference orders is at most the factorial of
the number of candidates. As such, we conjecture that it is possible to
design a polynomial-time algorithm for any fixed number of candidates.
This would imply that the Borda count is computationally vulnerable
to control by adding or deleting unweighted voters for constant numbers
of candidates. However, as we show above, control is hard for the
general case for adding voters (and very likely is also hard for deleting
voters). Intuitively, this is true since for large numbers of candidates,
the number of possible interactions becomes very high.
We considered at some length the possibility that the unweighted
Borda count is resistant to constructive control by deleting, as well
as by adding, voters. We attempted to modify the reduction used to
show the unweighted Borda count resistant to constructive control by
adding voters so that it would work in the case of deleting voters as
well; however, this work ran into difficulty.
The basic idea we attempted was to prevent spurious control possi-
bilities involving deleting voters other than those corresponding to set
members si; in an effort to do this, we made several alterations to the
reduction above. We attempted to set V to include both V ′ and V
from the existing reduction, and added two new candidates, c1 and c2.
Then we let r be the number of voters to be undeletable, that is, the
members of the initial V , and p be 3‖C‖. We gave each existing voter
a preference order with c1 and c2 near one another, as well as near c.
Next we created a voter with preference order c1 > (pr buffer candi-
dates) > c > (pr buffer candidates) > c2 > (all si) > (remaining buffer
candidates). All voters to be made undeletable then had c replaced with
c2 > (p buffer candidates) > c > (p buffer candidates) > c1 in their
preference orders. All voters initially in V ′ were given a preference
order with c > c1 > c2 in place of c . The intent of this mechanism
was that any spurious control attempt that removed an undeletable
voter(s) would have c beat by c1, and any that broke that mechanism
by removing the new voter would have c defeated by c2.
However, this strategy failed. The set of voters to make undeletable
included the large number of voters whose role was to make sure the
buffer candidates did not uniquely win. However, there are as many
such voters as there are buffer candidates (and so are not enough buffer
candidates to form the construction in the previous paragraph). Ad-
ditionally, the new voters gave c an advantage over the si, and if we
ranked the si near c, the balance between c, c1, and c2 could be dis-
torted. Adding more buffer candidates to overcome that effect would
not help, since we would still need the voters to make sure that buffer
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candidates did not uniquely win, and these voters would still need to
be undeletable.
Obvious methods of repairing this flaw also ran into problems. Mak-
ing only some “buffer candidate killer” voters undeletable could allow
only those having c higher than the si to remain after deletion, which
might introduce spurious control possibilities (and determining whether
such a situation existed might make the reduction outside P, since it
itself would be a special case of control by adding voters).
Making fewer buffer candidate killers would make it harder to guar-
antee that some of them didn’t sufficiently hurt all of the bi to prevent
their winning, making it difficult to allow the parts of the reduction
depending on approximate totals to succeed.
If we used no buffer candidate killers at all, or an insufficient num-
ber, there could be cases where control should be possible but wasn’t
(and hence the reduction failed) because a buffer candidate won. If
we “built in” killing by ranking the buffer candidates in a balanced
fashion within the si, with the average low, there would be a risk that
the control strategy that “should” work will fail because some “lucky”
buffer candidate beat c.
It is possible that future work could fix these problems, but it is
clear that for this particular voting system, showing resistance to dele-
tion of voters will often be a more complex case than that for addition
of voters. Showing resistance for the case of partition of voters would
likely be still more intricate, since it involves both adding and deleting
voters.
4.1.3. Constructive control by addition and deletion of weighted
voters. In this case, it is possible that we will only barely be able
to establish control, since causing the distinguished candidate to gain
ground against the current winner may help some third candidate even
more. The exact balancing involved makes the control problem hard if
weights can be large. The case of adding voters of course follows from
that unweighted case, but this proof is more elegant and more directly
applicable to weighted elections. In addition, we find a resistance re-
sult for elections of only three candidates, unlike the method used for
unweighted elections, which appears to require an unbounded number
of candidates, and even if it were improved would still require many
buffer candidates.
Theorem 4.1.4. The weighted Borda count, even with 3 candidates,
is resistant to constructive control by adding or deleting voters.
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Proof. It should be noted that, while we arrived at this proof
independently, the reduction from the partition problem, and some
technical details of the preference lists used, resemble the proof used
by [CLS07] in showing that manipulation of positional scoring proto-
cols for three candidates is hard (their Theorem 6, which specifically
mentions the Borda count case in its first corollary).
We show this by reduction from the partition problem. In this
problem, given a set S of positive integers, we must decide whether
there exists some subset of S that sums to half the overall sum t. We
note that, as pointed out by Garey and Johnson, this problem is NP-
complete even when restricted to positive integers; in fact, this is how
they specify the problem [GJ79].
In the case of adding voters, let the candidate set be {c, c1, c2}, with
c the distinguished candidate. For each element si of S, create a voter
vi with weight 6si and preference order c1 > c > c2. Further create
two special voters, v′ with weight 3t and preference order c2 > c > c1,
and vˆ with weight one and preference order c > c1 > c2. Make the
two special voters the initial V , add the vi to W and set k to 3t to
allow adding voters with a total weight equal to half the sum. If it
is possible to exert constructive control, the partition instance has a
solution; simply form one side of the partition from the set members
corresponding to the voters added to establish control.
We construct the reduction such that, in order for c to win, he or
she must gain a sufficient number of points against c2 without losing
too many points against c1. We design the preference orders so that
it is impossible for adding a vi to accomplish the former goal without
a partial compromise of the latter by the same amount. It is possible
that a control strategy might attempt to add voters corresponding to a
total score which is too large or small to form a valid partition. The role
of special voter v′ is to set up the desired sum by unbalancing the vote
totals so that a set of voters corresponding to a valid partition must
be added. When a partition exists, the best possible control strategy
will result in a tie. vˆ will break this tie in c’s favor. We note that,
since vˆ can help c’s standings against any other candidate by at most
two points (whereas an imbalance involving any set of other voters will
hurt by a multiple of three), vˆ will not contribute enough points to
save c when the partition is unsuccessful. We design the reduction
so that, in order to establish control, the chosen set of voters to be
added must exactly balance the contribution of the vote cast by v′ to
the races between c and each non-distinguished candidate. To do this,
those voters must total a weight equal to that of v′, which we will set
to 3t. Since the weights are six times the original set elements, the
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voters to be added will correspond to a subset with a sum of t
2
, which
is of course a valid partition.
If we attempt to add a subset summing to a total x which is less
than t
2
, then c will gain 6x points from the vi, 3t points from v
′, and
two points from vˆ, giving a total score of 6x + 3t + 2. Since x is an
integer, and can be at most t
2
− 1, c can gain no more than 6t − 4
points. Meanwhile, c1 will gain 6t points from v
′ and 1 from vˆ for a
total of 6t+ 1 and will defeat c by at least 5 points.
We cannot choose to add voters corresponding to a set summing
more than t
2
, since k = 3t and the weights are six times the values of the
corresponding set elements. It follows that control cannot established
unless we add voters corresponding to elements with a total of exactly
t
2
points.
In the reverse direction, if there is a valid partition, c can be made
to win by adding the voters corresponding to the members of one side
of the partition. This gives c a total of 6t+ 2 points against 6t+ 1 for
c1 and 6t for c2.
In the case of constructive control by deleting voters, essentially the
same construction can be used. We initially add all voters from both V
and W in the addition of voters case to V , and set k to ‖S‖ = ‖V ‖− 2
voters.
Essentially the same argument as for the addition of voters case ap-
plies. However we must ensure that neither special voter can be deleted
to establish control in a case in which it is impossible to establish con-
trol by deleting only from the vi. If vˆ is deleted, clearly this can only
harm the standing of c, whom vˆ ranks first. On the other hand, if v′
is deleted, we cannot then delete all of the vi since there are 2k total
weight among the vi and deleting v
′ alone used all the possible dele-
tions. Any of the vi who are allowed to vote in this case will overwhelm
vˆ and give victory to v1, since vˆ has power one, but none of the vi has
power below six. It follows that neither special voter may be deleted,
so the reduction from the prior result holds. 
We note in passing that this reduction works even if we consider
non-unique winners. This is true because a tie as the best possible
result can never happen: vˆ is the only voter with a power not a multiple
of three. As such, the point total of each candidate is guaranteed to be
congruent to a unique value modulo three in the addition of voters case.
The deletion of voters case requires a bit more thought, but clearly the
same property holds unless vˆ is deleted. If deleting vˆ causes a tie then
a partition existed. In this case, constructive control without the tie
will always be possible by deleting the same set but not deleting vˆ.
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4.1.4. Addition and deletion of unweighted voters speci-
fied in succinct representation. If voters are provided in succinct
representation, the result for the non-succinct case holds:
Theorem 4.1.5. The unweighted Borda count is computationally
vulnerable to destructive control by adding and by deleting voters if
voters are specified in succinct representation.
Proof. A variation of the proof of Theorem 4.1.1 works here. In
the case of deletion of voters, if the distinguished candidate c already
is not the unique winner, control is possible; output an empty set of
voters to be deleted. Otherwise, for each non-distinguished candidate
c′, while c is still the unique winner and we have deletions remaining
under k, use a simple greedy algorithm to determine the result if we
delete as many voters as possible from the “block” (group of voters)
which has the greatest positive preference distance between c and c′.
If, before c is no longer the unique winner, no remaining block ranks
c ahead of c′, or if we exhaust k, control is impossible using this c′. If
control is possible using some c′, output the set of voters to be deleted
for one such c′. Otherwise, output “control impossible”: if c can be
made to not uniquely win, this can be done by giving c′ the optimal
number of points for each deletion used, which can be done by first
taking the greatest preference distances, so this algorithm would have
succeeded.
In the case of addition of voters, the algorithm proceeds along much
the same lines: if the distinguished candidate c already is not the unique
winner, control is possible; output an empty set of voters to be added.
Otherwise, for each non-distinguished candidate c′, while c is still the
unique winner and we have additions remaining under k, use a simple
greedy algorithm to determine the result if we add as many voters
as possible from the block which has the greatest positive preference
distance between c′ and c. If, before c is no longer the unique winner,
no unadded group ranks c′ ahead of c, or if we exhaust k, control is
impossible using this c′. If control is possible using some c′, output the
set of voters to be added for one such c′. Otherwise, output “control
impossible”: if c can be made to not uniquely win, this can be done by
giving c′ the optimal number of points for each deletion used, which
can be done by first taking the greatest preference distances, so this
algorithm would have succeeded.
These algorithms proceed in polynomial time since they will al-
ways either add (delete) every voter in a group, or as many voters as
possible within the group, and that number is easy to calculate by com-
puting the room remaining under k. Rather trivially, a variant which
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produced results with the absolute minimum number of voters rather
than finding an arbitrary solution with at most k alterations would
also be polynomial-time; such a solution could simply add the mini-
mum number of voters needed from the last group, and can determine
this number in polynomial time using basic arithmetic. 
Theorem 4.1.6. The Borda count is resistant to constructive con-
trol by adding voters if voters are specified in succinct representation.
Proof. This result follows immediately from Theorem 4.1.2. 
We note that, contrary to one possible intuition, there is no obvious
connection to the weighted equivalent discussed in Section 4.3. This is
because while a partition instance can be represented by a weighted
election, doing the direct equivalent with a succinct representation
would be something closer to partition with divisible objects (which
is related to the continuous knapsack problem, an easy problem).
4.2. Partition of voters
Theorem 4.2.1. The unweighted Borda count is vulnerable to de-
structive control by partition of voters in case ties eliminate.
Proof. If the distinguished candidate c originally is not the unique
winner, control is trivially possible by choosing one sub-election to be
empty, and the other to contain every voter. If there are no more
than two candidates, and c initially is the unique winner, control is
impossible since c must win at least one partition (having the highest
number of points among the one or two candidates), and then must
win the runoff. This result, true for partition of voters in many scoring
protocols, is due to [HHR07a].
In all other cases, we must assign voters to sub-elections such that
c either is not the unique winner of either sub-election, or uniquely
wins exactly one, and is then tied or defeated in the runoff by the
other semifinalist, who must then at least tie him or her in a two-
candidate majority election (to which the two-candidate Borda count
is equivalent). In the former case, we must ensure that some candidates
c1 and c2, distinct from one another (if they are not, no solution exists
since c wins overall) as well as from c, respectively at least tie c in
the sub-elections V1 and V2 (whether or not they themselves win those
sub-elections). For each such pair of candidates, we initially proceed
as follows:
• Assign all voters who prefer c1 > c > c2 (possibly with addi-
tional candidates inserted) to V1, and all who prefer c2 > c > c1
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to V2. Clearly, these voters can only hurt c in those groups,
and only help c in the opposite groups.
• For each remaining voter v, compute the ratio of preference
distances prefdist(v, c, c1)/prefdist(v, c, c2). We term the vot-
ers who prefer both c1 and c2 to c “good voters,” and those
who prefer neither to c “bad voters.” The others were assigned
in the last step. Note that the bad voters with the highest ra-
tio are those that give c the most points over c1 for each point
they give c against c2. Conversely, the good voters with a high
ratio help c1 over c as much as possible for each point they
give c2 over c.
• Tentatively assign all good voters to V1 and all bad voters to
V2. If c1 does not defeat c in V1, control is impossible using
this pair of candidates. If c1 defeats c in V1, and c2 defeats c
in V2, control is possible; output the current partition.
• Otherwise, while c1 is still defeating or tying c in V1, and c is
defeating or tying c2 in V2:
– Among all the good voters in V1 and bad voters in V2,
move the voter with the lowest ratio into the other sub-
election. That voter will, intuitively, do the least to hurt,
or the most to help, the desired winner in the sub-election
into which he or she is moved.
When that loop terminates, if c is not the unique winner in either sub-
election, control is possible, and we can output the current partition.
If not, control may still be possible: the numbers of points contributed
by each voter may be relatively large integers (up the number of can-
didates). The above algorithm assigned good voters who give each
intended winner c1 or c2 as many points as possible over c in their re-
spective partitions, relative to the number of points those voters could
give the other intended winner if assigned differently (and likewise, bad
voters were assigned to take as few as possible). However, the above
algorithm may fail to establish control in a situation where the desired
winners in both sub-elections are nearly tied with c, and where mov-
ing some set of voters with a suboptimal ratio may allow the desired
result in both sub-elections but moving the voter with the optimal ra-
tio does not (informally, because it “overshoots” the desired result in
one sub-election, and leaves too many behind in the other). If c is
uniquely winning in both groups, or uniquely winning in one and tying
in the other, control is not possible with this pair of intended winners
(except possibly in the case where one intended winner defeats c in
a two-candidate majority election, dealt with later). At this point, if
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control can be established at all, it can be done by moving a set of
voters totaling at most ‖C‖, since this is the greatest number of points
any single voter can contribute; any larger differential will have been
handled by moving individual optimal voters earlier if it can be fixed
at all.
In order to deal with this potential problem, we must work out
exactly how many points are needed, or can be spared, in each sub-
election, and find a “fixing set” of voters to move to make both sub-
elections work. At first it appears that this prevents this algorithm
from being polynomial, since finding a set of voters to move will require
solving a variant of the knapsack problem, which is widely known to be
NP-complete. However, the most points any voter can give or take from
the result in any two-candidate race is the number of candidates ‖C‖,
and so moving a voter of optimal ratio cannot create an imbalance
greater than this number. If the input is expressed as a listing of
individual voters’ rankings of candidates, the input size is proportionate
to the products of the voter and candidate counts. This means that
the input size is not less than ‖C‖, which when expressed in unary
is shorter than our input, since each individual preference order is of
length greater than ‖C‖. The unary knapsack problem is in P, a fact
we will take advantage of.
Now, we can construct a unary knapsack instance. Assume without
loss of generality that c is presently uniquely winning in V1. Let m be
the “extra” victory margin, that is, the gap in points between c2and
c in V2. For each voter vi we create an item with weight equal to
prefdist(vi, c, c1) and value prefdist(vi, c, c2); note that one or both
values may be negative. Since the goal is not to move too many voters
and cause c to win in V2, we set the capacity to be m. If the knapsack
instance has a solution with total value equal to at least the number
of points by which c is defeating c1 in V1, control is possible by moving
the voters whose corresponding items were added to the knapsack.
This hurts c2 in V2 by those voters’ total weight, but since this is at
most m, c2 still defeats or ties c in V2. As such, c uniquely wins
neither partition, and so cannot win the election; control is possible;
we output the partitions accordingly. If the knapsack instance has no
such solution, control is not possible for the reasons outlined above.
If a fixing set exists or is not needed for some non-distinguished
candidates c1 and c2, control is possible; output the final partitions.
We note in passing that by setting a larger capacity (but still smaller
than the input size, since no margin of victory can be larger than
combined lengths of all preference orders) we could use this reduction
without the initial steps.
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Finally, we note that it is possible to establish control by allowing
c to win one sub-election, but not uniquely win in the runoff election
against the winner of the second sub-election. The run-off election is
of course a a two-candidate Borda election, which is equivalent to a
majority-vote election. For each candidate c′ who defeats c in such an
election (i.e., is preferred to c by a majority of voters, subject to our
tie-breaking criterion), we can run the algorithm above with intended
sub-winners of c and c′, and a distinguished candidate (intended loser)
of each other candidate. If and only if the algorithm fails again in every
case, control is impossible. This algorithm could of course be designed
to be more efficient by eliminating some redundant computations, but
in its current form suffices to establish that the control problem is in
P. 
In passing, we conjecture that since the unweighted Borda count
is resistant to constructive control by adding unweighted voters as per
Theorem 4.1.2, it is also resistant to constructive control by partition
of voters, which in a sense involves an extension of that method.
We conjecture that the unweighted Borda count is resistant to de-
structive control in model Ties-Promote. This appears likely to be
true because a potentially unlimited number of candidates may be tied
and proceed to the run-off, making control of the run-off in this spe-
cial case similar to control for addition and deletion of candidates. As
discussed in the next section, it is unclear how a polynomial-time al-
gorithm for control by addition and deletion of candidates in any case
could be designed. Additionally, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and
Rothe [HHR07a] find that plurality voting—in some ways a simpler
version of the Borda count—is resistant to destructive and constructive
control by partition of voters in model Ties-Promote, suggesting that
the same is likely to be true for the Borda count system.
4.3. Addition and deletion of candidates
In the weighted as well as unweighted Borda count, we do not an-
alyze the case of adding or deleting candidates. However, it seems
reasonable to conjecture that destructive control by adding or deleting
candidates is easy. In order to make the distinguished candidate c lose,
he or she must be beaten by some other candidate c′, and adding or
deleting any third candidate will change the relative ranking of these
two in an easily computable manner. More specifically, it is immedi-
ate that deleting a candidate ranked by a specific voter below c, but
above c′, will hurt c in the two-candidate race by that voter’s weight.
It is true that in some cases, other candidates will benefit and achieve
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a total still higher than the candidate whose relative performance is
under consideration, but when considering destructive control this is
unimportant.
In the case of adding or deleting candidates for constructive control,
we expect the Borda count to be resistant to these methods. This ap-
pears to be true because any single change in the set of candidates will
potentially affect how well the preferred or despised candidate performs
against all of the others (for example, inserting a candidate whom a
voter places between two original candidates will give one additional
point to the higher of these—as previously alluded to, this is one reason
why cloning of candidates can be beneficial, if the clone will narrowly
trail the original favored candidate in the eyes of many voters). The
interactions are complex, and the problem intuitively seems likely to
be hard. If it is easy, we would not expect it to be solvable by simple
algorithms like the one presented above. If any progress is made with
these cases, we anticipate that it will require methods unlike those pre-
viously applied to any voting system (though some insights from such
systems as k-plurality voting would likely apply). We discuss these
methods in our conclusions, but do note one important result:
Theorem 4.3.1. The Borda count, even for unweighted elections,
does not satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP).
Proof. As defined above, WARP is the property under which the
candidate winning an election is the winner of any subset containing
him or her. Consider an election with 3 (unweighted) voters and 4
candidates. The voters rank the candidates in the orders b > a > c > d,
b > a > d > c, and a > c > d > b, respectively. Candidate a wins.
However, if we consider the subset of candidates a, b then b wins; thus,
the winner a is not the winner of all subsets that contain him or her,
and the Borda count does not satisfy WARP. 
More generally, it is possible to create an election in which a poten-
tial candidate (here, candidates c and d) outside of the subset under
consideration will displace some candidates (here, a) into high rank-
ings more often than others (b), and hence give points to the displaced
candidates, who may not have won already if they were ranked low
by voters who ranked the potential candidate highly. Clearly, since
unweighted elections are a subset of weighted elections (that subset
in which all weights are equal to one), this also holds for weighted
elections.
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4.4. Summary of new results
We find the following:
• The unweighted Borda count is computationally vulnerable to
destructive control by adding and by deleting voters, even with
voters presented in succinct representation.
• The unweighted Borda count is computationally vulnerable to
destructive control by partition of voters in case Ties-Eliminate.
(We may reasonably conjecture that it is resistant in case Ties-
Promote, based on the results of [HHR07a] for plurality vot-
ing, which is in a sense a “simpler” system).
• The weighted Borda count, even with only three candidates,
is resistant to constructive control by adding and by deleting
voters.
• The unweighted Borda count is resistant to control by adding
voters at least in the case of unbounded numbers of candidates
whether or not voters are specified in succinct representation.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
We find that in the case of adding unweighted voters the Borda
count is computationally vulnerable to destructive control, but re-
sistant to constructive control. In the case of adding and deleting
weighted voters, it is resistant to constructive control with only three
candidates. These are the cases in which we might reasonably expect
it to be easiest to establish control (intuitively, partition of voters is a
combination of adding and deleting voters, while coordinating between
two sub-elections, and the methods of control involving alteration to
the candidate set are very complicated to consider for the Borda count
in general). As such, we might reasonably conjecture that further work
will show the weighted Borda count to be resistant to constructive con-
trol by every means (except in the case of two or fewer candidates,
where it degrades to a majority-vote election). Even in the unweighted
case, we show resistance for unbounded numbers of candidates, but
this result appears unlikely to hold with a fixed number of candidates,
particularly since the Borda count is vulnerable to constructive control
by adding and also by deleting voters with three candidates.
As a general rule, as we might expect, control is more difficult in
weighted Borda count elections. Clearly, it cannot be less difficult, since
unweighted elections are simply a special case of weighted elections in
which all voters have equal weight. Succinct representations appear to
be intermediate in difficulty in a sense. That is, in the case in which
a number of weighted candidates is changed to the same number of
groups of voters, it appears that the control problem becomes easier
in that we can use greedy algorithms rather than solving the partition
instance directly. As one concrete example of this, we find that in the
case of constructive control by adding or deleting weighted voters with
three candidates, the Borda count is resistant; on the other hand, in
the case of succinct representations, it is vulnerable.
Despite the Borda count’s high resistance to constructive control,
it is unlikely to be a practically useful election system due to the com-
mon and obvious strategies for manipulation. Particularly, as men-
tioned earlier, it is vulnerable to a manipulation strategy—viable even
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for individual voters—of reporting the gap between strong candidates
in one’s preference order as wider than it in fact is. As we mentioned,
these strategies can potentially allow a single voter to have power much
out of proportion with his or her actual preference distance between the
strong candidates. Worse, it is possible that many voters in political
elections will use this type of tactical voting. An obvious strategy for
tactical voting is to place weak candidates in the middle of the reported
preference order, with the liked and disliked strong candidates near the
beginning and end, respectively. Some manipulators might be unfamil-
iar with the weak candidates, and rank them in an “obvious” order, for
example alphabetically or in the order in which candidates appear on
the ballot. This might give an advantage to the first weak candidate in
this order, who would gain second-place points from voters tactically
voting to aid any strong candidate, perhaps leading to a candidate with
very little actual support or recognition winning. On the other hand,
a “typical” (informally speaking) manipulation strategy for plurality
voting, for example, will benefit a voter’s favorite among the strong
candidates and nobody else. There is, then, much more chance in a
Borda count election that a relative unknown could win due to inter-
acting attempts at manipulation (whether or not the election reaches
the “ideal” result, from the perspective of the voters’ preferences, is
another issue, and of course all reasonable voting systems are manipu-
lable).
The manipulation strategies for many commonly used voting sys-
tems, such as plurality voting, approval voting, and instant runoff vot-
ing generally do not allow amplification of effectiveness for individual
dishonest voters. In these systems, the total influence of any voter on
a pairwise contest between any pair of candidates is limited to that
voter’s power. The systems do not consider preference distance. In
limiting the worst-case effectiveness of manipulation, this weakness be-
comes a strength in a sense. Along the same lines, these other systems
do not suffer from the same extreme vulnerability to cloning of can-
didates found in the Borda count. Of course, plurality voting at least
does have problems with a spoiler effect. In fact, all the most com-
mon systems are vulnerable to some forms of control or manipulation
(and, again, no reasonable system can ever be completely immune to
manipulation).
While it has significant problems with manipulation, it is interest-
ing to note that the Borda count is resistant to constructive control
by adding and by deleting weighted voters even with small numbers
of candidates. This could potentially make it a practical system for
5. CONCLUSIONS 53
weighted elections in which this is a concern, such as perhaps corpo-
rate shareholder meetings in which it may be possible to discourage
certain shareholders from attending the meeting, such as by delaying
mail to some, and conversely possible to remind others to attend.
As another advantage, the Borda count tends to choose a candidate
with a broad base of support. In the context of political elections in
particular, all voters may be pleased with a candidate who is somewhat
moderate. A plurality election in the same may become essentially
a race between two extreme candidates, either of whom about half
the population might be strongly displeased with. More concretely, if
there are five candidates, and roughly half the voter population has
a ranking of a > b > c > d > e, while most of the remainder has
e > d > c > b > a, a plurality election is certain to choose one of
the “extreme” candidates. Even in this case with “extremist” voters,
however, the Borda count will be about equally likely to choose any
candidate, depending on exactly how the votes are cast (if the election
had two voters, one of each of the above forms, it would actually be
a five-way tie). Which system this tendency is an “advantage” for
is of course highly subjective, and depends on the goals for which the
voting system is applied: if we want to minimize the number of strongly
displeased voters, the Borda count may be better, while if we want to
make sure that as many voters as possible get their very first choice,
the plurality system will be better (and, clearly, is the best possible
system here).
It is also interesting to note that the fact that a control or ma-
nipulation problem is NP-complete does not necessarily mean that
the election is safe from practical manipulation and control. First of
all, in many political elections there are only two or three candidates
with a reasonable chance of winning in practice (even in nations with
several major parties, all individual candidates may not be equally
qualified, for example). Additionally, Procaccia and Rosenschein es-
tablish that certain NP-hard manipulation problems can be solved in
polynomial time on average across certain probability-weighted “junta
distributions” [PR06]. More exactly, they find that (apparently only
unweighted) scoring protocols—such as the Borda count for fixed num-
bers of candidates—are “sensitive” to manipulation by coalitions (i.e.,
cooperating groups) of voters averaged across these distributions when
the number of candidates is constant. This result is of potential concern
for political elections, in which the number of candidates will frequently
be very small. Of course, other systems, including plurality voting, are
scoring protocols for fixed numbers of voters just as the Borda count
is.
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As we state in the introduction, the Borda count has philosophical
advantages in addition to its computational properties. In particular,
it is one of relatively few voting systems which make use of all the
information provided by the voters in a standard preference order of the
sort we consider. Most other systems consider only the first preference
as in the case of plurality voting, a few early preferences as in instant
runoff voting, or a simplified “summary” of preferences as in approval
voting. Once we decide to model preferences as a simple sorted list,
using the entire list seems only reasonable. If we use more information
(e.g. asking voters how much their opinion of successive candidates in
the list differs), we open up fairly obvious strategies for tactical voting
that do not even require voters to lie about their preference order. For
example, in that case, voters could widen those gaps between strong
candidates, and leave those above the first, and below the last, strong
candidate narrow.
The Borda count’s “reverse spoiler effect” encouraging cloning of
candidates can reasonably be seen as a theoretical weakness. However,
from a philosophical standpoint it may be seen as an advantage in the
context of political elections. It may be ideal for voters to be offered
a choice between a relatively large number of candidates, who might
better represent the range of opinions among the voters. One way to
meet this goal is to ensure that the stronger candidates do not have an
incentive to discourage other candidates of similar views as plurality
voting tends to (we can consider, for example, the tendency in U.S.
presidential elections for stronger candidates to attempt to keep similar
weak candidates out of the debates). Of course, in a Borda count
election we run into the exact opposite problem: it may be to the
benefit of strong candidates to discourage those weak candidates that
oppose them. However, it is possible that the most reasonable way to
discourage weak opponents would be for candidates to engage in debate
with all opponents, even weak ones who might not be invited otherwise,
which may be seen as desirable from the perspective of society.
It should be noted that this definition of “strong” and “weak” can-
didates is informal, but is reasonable to consider in our general context
of perfect knowledge, in which voters and candidates can recognize
those candidates who are presently leading. In addition, it has some
application to real political elections, in which there are often one or
several candidates (e.g., minor-party candidates or extremists) who
cannot be reasonably expected to win, a fact which is known to all
concerned. Along the same lines, in artificial intelligence applications,
there may be certain alternatives which efficient heuristics suggest are
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only marginally worthy of consideration. It might be possible for “vot-
ers” to apply these heuristics, and use the results in a control strategy
(accepting some risk that the heuristics fail).
Despite theoretical deficiencies in the Borda count, Reilly points out
that Nauru and Kiribati are among relatively few nations outside the
West to remain free since independence, and do so in spite of significant
practical problems such as poverty [Rei02]. Kiribati uses the Borda
count in committee elections within parliament, which decide who will
stand for president (a national plurality election is then held among
the three or four highest-scoring Borda count winners, who are chosen
by and among the members of parliament). As we might expect, the
committee elections have a small number of voters, who have some
knowledge of one another’s preferences and opportunity to collude; in
one particular election, this allowed manipulation. More specifically,
the outgoing government and a group of independents forced out the
leader of the opposition, in favor of their own respective leaders and two
candidates who had no real intent of running. The nationwide four-
candidate election then effectively had to choose between the leaders
of the two cooperating groups of manipulators [Rei02]. This outcome,
in view of the Borda count’s overall success in Kiribati, shows that the
Borda count is very much a mixed blessing. But, of course, we might
say the same of any other reasonable voting system, and neither our
results nor any existing ones call this into doubt.
5.1. Further work
In view of our work, many open questions remain. Firstly, it is
completely unclear how the Borda count performs against control via
alterations to the candidate set, (including against addition, deletion,
partition, and runoff partition of candidates). In the case of arbitrary
numbers of candidates, we conjecture that the Borda count is resistant
to control by most or all of these means. This is due to complicated in-
teractions of gaining or losing points as candidates leave a (sub)election.
That said, it is immediate that candidate-related problems are easy
with any constant number of candidates since we can simply try all
possibilities. However, if the Borda count is modified to only consider
each voter’s highest few (constant number of) preferences, it is unclear
what would result.
One interesting question is whether the Borda count can be made
more resistant to control via relatively minor modifications to prevent
easily computing trade-offs in greedy algorithms. For example, we
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could change the system so that some changes of one position in pref-
erence orders are worth more points than others. For example, we
could give 999 points to the first choice and 501 to the second choice
of each voter in a three-candidate election without greatly distorting
the results of most real-world elections. A reasonable conjecture is that
this sort of change will not affect the difficulty of control, even if the
new set of weights is specified in binary, unless the modifications are
relatively large (in other words, often make the winner different than in
a standard Borda count election). Hybridization is one technique which
might make control harder than an unmodified Borda count election.
Construction of modified (“hybrid”) voting systems resistant to vari-
ous methods is considered by [HHR07b], who use this technique to
find an election system resistant to every standard means of control
(however, the resulting voting system is much more complex than the
Borda count).
We may consider how the modified Borda count used in Nauru
(which gives one point to the first-ranked candidate for each voter,
1/2 to the second, and generally 1/m to the mth) performs against
manipulation and bribery, as well as control. We conjecture that con-
trol of this variant will be no easier than the more common variant,
and possibly harder because control of this sort of election could not
use simple calculations based on preference distance, on which many
of our results for unweighted elections depend. For example, in this
case a voter with a > b > c does not help a against c as much as two
voters with a > c > b do, and as we add more candidates matters
become increasingly complicated. Of course, all point totals will be
rational numbers, and comparison of rational numbers in fraction form
is an easy problem (even when the numerator and denominator are
unbounded, as with unbounded numbers of candidates), so we do not
expect a great change in complexity, except perhaps in the succinct
representation case.
It is possible that approximating control in the “Nauru count” (that
is, designing a polynomial-time algorithm which successfully exerts con-
trol in all cases in which it is possible to make the desired winner lead
all rivals by, for example, 1/10 of the points, but fails for some cases
in which the margin of victory is narrower) would be easier than for
the standard Borda count, since it might be possible to disregard or
summarize certain lower preferences. For example, in a 100 candidate
election, a candidate ranked 90th by a voter has an advantage of only
1/900th of a point over the candidate ranked 100th, and it would take
dozens to hundreds of such voters to make up for one voter ranking the
candidates in the opposite order in the top 5.
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We may also consider whether constructive control of weighted
Borda count elections by various methods of altering the voting set
is polynomial in any special cases, e.g., when some subset of the can-
didates have a very small amount of support. It seems reasonable that
this might allow “space” to help the distinguished candidate while also
helping such weak candidates, but not enough to risk them winning,
but how well this generalizes is unclear. This scenario is applicable to
many real-world cases; for example, political elections often have a few
strong candidates, and many proposed solutions (e.g., chess moves) are
clearly bad and will have little support. If this particular special case
is vulnerable to control, we might then consider whether a few weak
candidates suffice, or if it is necessary that the great majority be weak.
Then we could consider the average case, for example, the case in which
weak candidates are randomly placed within the bottom half of voter
preferences.
We might consider how the Borda count behaves with small con-
stant numbers of voters, for example two or three, but large numbers
of candidates. Intuitively, it appears that in this scenario the system
would become vulnerable to all forms of control involving alteration
of the voter set, since it would be easy to compute the results of the
election under each possible change. However, there might still be re-
sistance to means of control involving candidates.
The Borda count clearly has a significant weakness against manip-
ulation as well as against certain means of control. Dummet notes
that a “penalty for dissimilarity” between candidates in a given voter’s
presence order, effectively applied against the latter, and that this is
the reason why adding a clone of a candidate may help that candidate
[Dum98], and proceeds to modify the system to fix this. We might
consider whether something similar will work against control.
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